Abstract: This study aims to examine the relative effects of making the statement, "I think I may have depressive disorder" as an excuse (i.e., insisting on depression) by comparing it with typical statements of excuse (i.e., physical illness, work requirements, and negligence). Participants were 238 Japanese undergraduates who read a scenario describing a social predicament and assessed excuse values in terms of their cognitive and behavioral reactions elicited by the excuse-maker. The results showed that insisting on depression was evaluated as a valid excuse, as were physical illness and work requirements, albeit there was no description of any obstacle to the excuse-maker's progress including depressive symptoms. When these three statements were used as excuses, the participants were more likely to consider the target favorably and were motivated to behave more generously towards him than when he made no excuse or said, "I forgot" (i.e., negligence). We discuss the results while referring to recent social changes in Japan. The implications of these findings for the phenotype of people with modern type depression are discussed.
This study aims to examine the relative effects of making the statement, "I think I may have depressive disorder" as an excuse (i.e., insisting on depression; Yamakawa & Sakamoto, 2015) in a social predicament. In the present study, we compared such a statement, insisting on depression, with other typical excuses examined in the study by Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, and Verette (1987;  i.e., physical illness, work requirements, and negligence).
Excuse-making is categorized as tactical (i.e., short-term) defensive impression management in social psychology, especially in the area of self-presentation (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985) . Snyder and Higgins (1988) defined excuse-making as "the motivated process of shifting causal attributions for negative personal outcomes from sources that are relatively more central to the person's sense of self to sources that are relatively less central, thereby resulting in perceived benefits to the person's image and sense of control" (p. 23). When people experience a predicament in which they are reproved for their failures, they may make an excuse in order to restore a positive identity to otherwise avoid the negative reactions of others by evading their responsibility. For example, previous studies revealed that individuals sometimes claim their bad condition in a social predicament (Baumgardner, 1991; Baumgardner, Lake, & Arkin, 1985; Braginsky & Braginsky, 1967; Jones & Berglas, 1978; Schouten & Handelsman, 1987; Snyder & Smith, 1981; Suhr & Wei, 2013) . People seem to show not only symptoms of physical illness or injury but also symptoms of mental illness as an excuse. Among various mental illnesses, depression may be more likely to be used as an excuse, because depression is prevalent among people (Kanba, 2011) , and perception toward depression is better than other mental illnesses (Crisp, Gelder, Rix, Meltzer, & Rowlands, 2000) . Thus, the present study focuses on depression as an excuse.
Although depressive symptoms as well as symptoms of physical illness or injury may function as an excuse, there is an important difference among them. That is, unlike the case of showing the symptoms of physical illness or injury, it is difficult for us to observe depressive symptoms in others. Instead, we usually know about the depressive symptoms of others by their self-report. Hence, when a depressed person makes an excuse in a social predicament by insisting on depression, we may doubt the existence of depression and have difficulty in judging whether the excuse is true. Thus, when considering the validity of depressive symptoms as an excuse, it is important to examine the effects of self-report of depression per se. However, previous studies that examined the interpersonal effects of showing depressive symptoms as an excuse used the case vignette method presenting with depressive symptoms, and, to date, few studies evaluating the effects of the excuse statement per se are available. 4 Concerning this point, Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) adopted the scenario in which the protagonist in the vignette did not show any symptom of depression and examined the effects of insisting on depression as an excuse; that is, the effects of just saying "I think I may have depressive disorder." Their results indicated that even if an individual did not show depressive symptoms, suggesting he/she had a depressive disorder in a social predicament would be more acceptable than saying nothing. However, there is a limitation in the study by Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) . They did not compare insisting on depression with other types of excuses. Indeed, because Tyler and Feldman (2007) demonstrated that the interpersonal consequences of offering an invalid excuse were the same as or worse than not making excuses, the results of the study by Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) should be interpreted as finding that the insistence on depression in the absence of symptoms at least functions as a valid excuse. However, little is known about how valid insisting on depression is as an excuse. For this reason, it would be necessary to examine the interpersonal effects of insisting on depression as an excuse by comparing it with multiple alternative excuses.
Therefore, this study aimed to extend previous research on the effects of insisting on depression by comparing it with multiple excuses without describing any objective 4 There is a social background to examining the effects of self-report of depression per se, specifically, insisting on depression. Since the late 1990s, modern type depression (MTD; Kato et al., 2011) has become a social problem in Japan. People with MTD often claim to have depression, although they do not show typical depressive symptoms, such as crying, slowing-down of thought, and a reduction of physical movements; they do not appear ill at all in some cases. Thus, not only professionals but also laypeople are bewildered.
evidence (e.g., symptoms).
5 In order to select appropriate excuses to be compared with insisting on depression as an excuse, we referred to the work of Weiner et al. (1987) . Weiner et al. (1987) classified and examined the effects of excuses collected via interviews into the following six categories: transportation problems, work or school requirements, other commitments, physical illness, negligence, and preference. Consequently, they showed that both negligence and preference elicited greater anger than any of the other categories; in particular, preference produced greater anger than did negligence. Although Weiner et al. (1987) did not fully report or discuss these results, physical illness and transportation problems seemed to be the most valid excuses that resulted in the least anger. Finally, the remaining two categories of excuses-that is, other commitments and work or school requirements-were intermediately valid excuses.
From these categories, we chose three (i.e., work or school requirements, negligence, and physical illness) as comparison objects for the following three reasons: (a) as noted in the Method section, because we applied the scenario from Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) , "transportation problems" were unsuitable for that situation; (b) preference (e.g., "I didn't want to do that") does not meet the definition of excuse-making (Snyder & Higgins, 1988) ; and (c) the "other commitments" category is too vague for designing specific excuses, and its content is similar to "work or school requirements," in the sense that excuse-makers had other plans or duties. In summary, by adding "no excuse" as a control condition, the relative effects of insisting on depression were examined under five conditions.
On the whole, this study approached the goal in two steps. First, this study hypothesized that insisting on depression would be accepted as a more valid excuse than no excuse and negligence. This is because Weiner et al. (1987) indicated that negligence was an invalid excuse, and Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) suggested that insisting on depression functions as a valid excuse. Second, without any hypothesis on the order of validity as excuses, this study examined the interpersonal consequences of insisting on depression by comparing it with the two remaining excuses (i.e., work requirements and physical illness). This investigation will clarify the relative position of insisting on depression without showing depressive symptoms as an excuse.
Method Sample Size Estimation
To detect a mean difference between the experimental conditions, the sample size was determined a priori by referring to the work of Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) . Because their study yielded an effect size of f = 0.37, we conservatively estimated that our study would achieve at least f = 0.25, which is a medium effect size according to Cohen's (1988) index. Hence, with an α-value of .05, power of 80%, and an effect size of f = 0.25, a minimum of 40 participants was needed for each group.
Participants and Design
The participants were 238 Japanese undergraduates (128 females, M age = 19.40 years, SD = 1.67; 110 males, M age = 19.22 years, SD = 1.22) enrolled in general psychology and several other courses at two private universities located in eastern Japan (i.e., Kanto area). This study was described as a survey about interpersonal impressions. The participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: no excuse, insisting on depression, work requirements, negligence, and physical illness.
6 All questionnaires were completed anonymously. Vignette A vignette was adapted from Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) . This vignette described a social predicament in which a target person failed to fulfill a promise. Specifically, a student who was taking a course in college did not complete the group homework assignment, while other group members did. The vignette was divided into two parts.
The first half of the vignette was the making promises part. It briefly introduced the target person and the situation. The scene ended with the protagonist making a promise to his friends. However, there was no description of any obstacle to the target's progress including depressive symptoms. The second half of the vignette was the reneging part. Although the main character had made an earlier promise, he did not fulfill his responsibility. The experimental manipulation was conducted in this part of the vignette. In the no-excuse condition, the vignette ended with a sentence describing a situation in which the target broke his promise. On the other hand, in the excuse conditions in which the target made some excuse (i.e., insisting on depression, work requirements, negligence, or physical illness), the excuse statements were added to the last part: "When asked by the other members about why he had not done so, he replied, 'I could not do it. I think I may have depressive disorder" (insisting on depression). In the other excuse conditions, the underlined sentence was replaced with "I was asked by a friend to work instead of him" (work requirements), "I forgot" (negligence), or "I was out of shape" (physical illness). The only difference between these conditions was the presence of one of these sentences.
Dependent Variables
After the scenario, the dependent variables, which were also adopted from Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) , were presented. These included ratings to assess impressions and feelings towards the target (12 items; e.g., likeability, integrity, sympathy) and to gauge how they would respond (seven items; e.g., punishing, forgiving, blaming, commiserating). The response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Ratings for negative content were reverse-scored to facilitate interpretation. Thus, high scores represented positive cognition/affect or positive behavioral reactions. We aggregated these items into two variables: cognitive aspect of the effects of excuse and behavioral aspect of the effects of excuse. These variables showed acceptable internal consistency and reliability. Cronbach's alphas for the cognitive aspect and behavioral aspect scores were α = .84, 95% confidence interval (CI) [.79, .89 
Manipulation Checks
To check the target's perceived responsibility, three items were presented after the first half of the vignette in the same manner as Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) . This was because the excuse had minimal effects on the character ratings of, and the negative repercussions to, the excuse-maker when the excuse-maker was perceived to be less responsible for the particular detrimental consequences (Tyler & Feldman, 2007) . Three items assessing the responsibility of the target read as follows: "An obligation or duty the target person had to do was clear," "The target person had enough capacity to perform his obligation or duty," and "The target person personally completed his obligation or duty." These were anchored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). These items were based on the triangle model of responsibility (Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994) and each represented the three factors that defined responsibility in this model.
Procedure
Participants answered the questionnaire during a lecture slot, but they completed all measures individually. All participants were informed of their rights as research participants and were briefly oriented to the outline of this study. After all the questionnaires were collected, the participants were thoroughly debriefed and were fully informed about the true nature of the experiment.
Statistical Analyses R for Windows version 3.2.0 (R Development Core Team, 2012) and "anovakun version 4.6.2," an analysis of variance (ANOVA) function that runs on R software, were used for all statistical analyses. The sample standard deviation was calculated by using R package rpsychi (Okumura, 2012 ), Cronbach's alpha was calculated by using R package psych (Revelle, 2015) and 95% CIs of effect sizes were estimated by using the R package MBESS (Kelley & Lai, 2012) . The significance level was set at α = .05 for all analyses, and post-hoc comparisons were conducted using Holm's procedure, which is the default in anovakun. Because a preliminary analysis found that there were no significant sex differences, the data from female and male participants were pooled to enhance statistical power.
Results

Manipulation Check
Data from 22 participants were excluded from further data analysis because they judged the target to be less responsible. More precisely, participants who responded to at least one item on the manipulation checks assessing perceived responsibility of the target as 1 (strongly disagree) or 2 (disagree) were excluded. However, when we analyzed the data including the results of these 22 participants, the effects remained essentially unchanged. Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and 95% CIs of all variables in the analysis across the five conditions. The effect of the excuse was evaluated using a one-way between-subjects ANOVA. The dependent measures included both behavioral and cognitive aspects of the excuse-effect. The data analyses yielded significant main effects of excuse for both dependent variables: F(1, 211) = 17.42, p < .001, η 2 = .25, 95% CI [0.14, 0.33] (behavioral aspect); and F(1, 211) = 11.03, p < .001, η 2 = .17, 95% CI [0.08, 0.25] (cognitive aspect). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that insisting on depression, physical illness, and work requirements were rated significantly higher than the no-excuse condition for both the behavioral and cognitive aspects. Both dependent variables for physical illness also scored higher than for negligence. However, it was only in the behavioral aspect that the following significant differences were obtained: insisting on depression was higher than negligence, and physical illness was higher than either work requirements or insisting on depression. In other words, the cognitive aspect scores of insisting on depression did not differ significantly from those of negligence.
Analysis
Discussion
To examine the relative effects of "insisting on depression," we compared the interpersonal consequences of excuse-making with insisting on depression, no-excuse as a control condition, and three typical excuses (i.e., physical illness, work requirements, and negligence) in a social predicament. First, we consider the hypothesis that insisting on depression would be accepted as a more valid excuse than no excuse and negligence, and then we sequentially discuss the differences in evaluations between insisting on depression, work requirements, and physical illness. Our hypothesis was partly supported. The score of behavioral aspects of the excuse effect (i.e., the degree to which one would behave generously to an excuse-maker) in the insisting-on-depression condition was significantly higher than those of either the negligence or control conditions; however, the score for cognitive aspects of the excuse effect (i.e., the degree to which one would have positive impression or feelings to an excuse-maker) in the insisting-ondepression condition was significantly higher than that of the control condition only. Although the mean differences in behavioral aspect score were consistent with our prediction, the slight differences in cognitive aspect score were unexpected. We discuss these few differences in impression/feeling evaluations later.
Next, we focus on the differences in evaluations between insisting on depression, physical illness, and work requirements. The behavioral aspect score of insisting on depression was significantly lower than that of physical illness and was nearly equal to that of work requirements. On the other hand, there were few differences in the ratings of the cognitive aspect between insisting on depression, physical illness, and work requirements. The few differences in cognitive aspect score were observed again between these three statements of excuse. Because most previous studies on the interpersonal consequences of excuse-making measured a single dependent variable (e.g., anger; Weiner et al., 1987) or compared valid excuses with invalid excuses (e.g., Pontari, Schlenker, & Christopher, 2002; Tyler & Feldman, 2007; Weiner et al., 1987) , few studies have examined the effect of multiple conditions, including the no-excuse condition. Hence, the different evaluations between behavioral reactions and cognition (i.e., impressions and feelings) have not yet been considered. These results suggest that various excuses might conspicuously differ from one another in the behavioral reactions of the observers but not so much in cognition. Because an individual who is confronted with a social predicament failed to do something, the impressions of or feelings toward an excuse-maker have already become worse. That may be why there were few differences in the cognitive aspect of the excuse effect among the valid excuses. However, as mentioned above, the different evaluations between behavioral reactions and cognition were unexpected results. Hence, further research that directly examines these differences may be needed.
Taken together, these results suggest, generally speaking, that insisting on depression was neither the worst, nor the best, excuse. We suggest that even if there seem to be no depressive symptoms, insisting on depression, that is, a mere statement of "I think I may have depressive disorder," is a moderately valid excuse. Although Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) suggest that insisting on depression functions at least as a valid excuse compared to not making an excuse, its relative effects are unknown. In this respect, adding to the findings of Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) , our study results suggest that insisting on depression functions better than negligence but worse than physical illness, and it functions about the same as work requirements.
There are sequential possible explanations of why, even if the excuse-maker does not show any symptoms, insisting on depression functions as a valid excuse. Growing awareness of depressive disorders might have influenced Japanese public attitudes towards depressive disorder. Since the late 1990s, health education regarding depressive disorder has increased throughout Japan (Kanba, 2011) . As a result, the stigma of depression has been reduced somewhat (Hayashi, 2001 ). For instance, more Japanese than Australians thought that people with depressive disorder would not be discriminated against by others within the community (Griffiths et al., 2006) . Hence, a kind of implicit social norm to behave generously toward people with depressive disorder may exist. Consequently, even if the target did not show any symptoms, individuals accepted the statement, "I think I may have depressive disorder" as a valid excuse. The results of this study might reflect such people's attitude. 8 The results may contribute to understanding the phenotype of people with modern type depression (MTD). As discussed above, the stigma of depression has been reduced somewhat. Moreover, apparently people behave generously toward others who suggest that they have depressive disorder. Therefore, it is easy for people with MTD to disclose that they may have depressive disorder and the sick role (Parsons, 1951) may function for them. However, the results of this study also indicated that physical illness was the most valid excuse. Insisting on depression is less valid than having a physical illness, which was one of the most popular and most typical excuse statements (Weiner et al., 1987) . Hence, future studies should examine the distinctiveness of insisting on depression in approaching the question of why people with MTD expressly claim to have a depressive disorder rather than merely claiming to feel bad.
Finally, we discuss the limitations of this study and suggestions for future research. Three limitations require consideration concerning generalizability. Because we used a case vignette method, a laboratory experiment that investigates the interpersonal consequences of insisting on depression in face-to-face communication will be needed. Second, the results were limited to undergraduates and they need to be replicated with other age groups. Third, we should note that our study and that of Yamakawa and Sakamoto (2015) examined the interpersonal effects of insisting on depression only in a one-time interaction. That is, whether insisting on depression is accepted as a valid excuse in the medium-long term is still unknown. Although traditional methods of examining the interpersonal effects of excuse making have generally adopted a one-time interaction scenario, future studies should examine the longitudinal or repeated effects of excuse-making.
